The Burger Court: Discord in Search and Seizure by Irons, Robert S.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 3 Article 3
1974
The Burger Court: Discord in Search and Seizure
Robert S. Irons
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Supreme Court of the
United States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law
Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert S. Irons, The Burger Court: Discord in Search and Seizure, 8 U. Rich. L. Rev. 433 (1974).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss3/3




... [Tihe States, more likely than not, will be placed in an
atmosphere of uncertainty since this Court's decisions in the realm
of search and seizure are hardly notable for their predictability.
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in Ker v. California.'
The accession of Mr. Chief Justice Burger to the Supreme Court
of the United States was expected to signal the limitation of consti-
tutional doctrines by which the Court had enhanced the rights of
the criminal defendant. The fulfillment of this expectation has been
generally marked by decisions which have been readily and quickly
comprehensible. For example, the prosecution was prohibited by
the Warren Court from employing any products of the defendant's
custodial interrogation in the absence of a warning of his right to
counsel and his right to remain silent;2 the statement so procured
is still barred in the case in chief but can be used to impeach the
defendant's trial testimony.3 Post-indictment confrontation by an
identifying witness was established as a critical stage at which the
suspect was absolutely entitled to the assistance of counsel;4 the
Burger Court has not extended this right to counsel to confronta-
tions before institution of criminal proceedings5 nor to post-
indictment photographic identification.'
With respect to the fourth amendment's proscription of unreason-
able searches and seizures, however, the course of decisions has been
* Special Assistant, Supreme Court of Virginia, 1970- ; Assistant United States Attorney,
Western District of Virginia, 1966-1970; J.D., Washington and Lee University, 1949. The
opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author, and specifically they are not intended
to represent the views of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
1. 374 U.S. 23, 45 (1963).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436 (1966).
3. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
4. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
5. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
6. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
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less predictable. In the application of particular rules inherited from
the Warren Court, the Burger Court has fragmented completely;
this is illustrated particularly by the exigent circumstances which
may justify a warrantless search7 and the search warrant affiant's
disclosure of the reliability of his informant. 8 In other cases, where
friction among the Justices might not have been so clearly antici-
pated, there has been a marked change in the trend of decisions,
notably with regard to the standards to determine voluntary con-
sent,9 the attempted invocation of the fourth amendment in grand
jury hearings,"' and the scope of search of the arrestee's person."
It has been argued that the unpredictability of opinions in the
search and seizure opinions results from ad hoc solutions of specific
problems which are inevitable where the constitutional standard is
one of "reasonableness."' 2 It is the theme of this article that the
dissension elicited by particular fourth amendment questions is in-
stead indicative of profound cleavages in fundamental concepts
among the Justices.
The essential principle of the law of search and seizure is the
exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 3 which for sixty years
has prohibited the introduction in federal prosecutions of evidence
procured in violation of the fourth amendment. In Mapp v. Ohio'4
the Warren Court incorporated the exclusionary rule in the four-
teenth amendment to the end that the products of an unreasonable
search and seizure were inadmissible in state courts. Ker v.
California'5 required that the reasonableness of a search and seizure
be determined by the same standard in both federal and state
courts. Newly delineated fourth amendment rights were limited to
prospective application,'6 but search and seizure claims were held
7. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
8. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
9. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
10. United States v. Calandra, 94 S.Ct. 613 (1974).
11. United States v. Robinson, 94 S.Ct. 467 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S.Ct. 488
(1973).
12. Stewart, J., in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971); Kurland, 1970
Term: Notes on the Emergence of the Burger Court, THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 265, 298
(1971).
13. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
14. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
16. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). The precise holding of Linkletter was that
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cognizable in federal collateral attack as in direct review.1 7
II.
It is often difficult to disentangle controversy concerning the
exclusionary rule itself from arguments in support of particular pos-
itions on prospectivity or collateral attack. However, at the risk of
repetition it is well to begin with the criticism of the exclusionary
rule as the basic premise in fourth amendment analysis.
This criticism was first manifested in the Burger Court by Mr.
Justice Black's dissent from the decision of Whiteley v. Warden'"
that there was insufficient cause for arrest and incidental search. To
the dissenting Justice this holding was "a distortion" of the fourth
amendment, which "does not expressly command that the evidence
obtained by its infraction should always be excluded from proof."' 9
The Chief Justice joined this dissent, and Mr. Justice Blackmun
agreed "with much that is said by Mr. Justice Black. '20
Mr. Justice White announced the judgment of the Court in
United States v. White, 2, which sustained electronic eavesdropping
by a transmitter worn by the informant. In the course of a plurality
opinion, 22 he stated that the Court should be reluctant to "erect
constitutional barriers to relevant and probative evidence which is
also accurate and reliable. 12 3 Although there was an abundance of
other opinions, 4 that particular declaration passed unchallenged.
The first major assault upon the exclusionary rule was Mr. Chief
Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.2 1
A majority of the Court concluded that, even in the absence of
legislation, violation of the fourth amendment by a federal agent
Mapp v. Ohio was inapplicable to judgments which had become final before its rendition.
Subsequent fourth amendment decisions, commencing with Desist v. United States, 394 U.S
244 (1969), employed as the critical date for prospectivity the date of seizure rather than the
date of judgment.
17. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
18. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
19. Id. at 572.
20. Id. at 575.
21. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
22. Mr. Justice White was joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart and Blackmun, JJ.
23. 401 U.S. at 753.
24. There were separate concurrences by Black and Brennan, JJ., and separate dissents
by Douglas, Harlan, and Marshall, JJ.
25. 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971).
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created a cause of action for damages, and all other opinions, except
for the Burger dissent, were directed to this relatively narrow issue.
To the Chief Justice, however, the holding of the Court served "the
useful purpose of exposing the fundamental weaknesses of the sup-
pression doctrine,"2 and the remainder of his dissent elaborated
that criticism.
The Chief Justice summarily rejected as justifications for the ex-
clusionary rule the propositions that the government should not be
allowed to profit from its illegal acts and that suppression is re-
quired by the relationship between the fourth and fifth amend-
ments.27 Rather, the rule is founded on the theory that law enforce-
ment officers are deterred from unlawful searches and seizures if the
evidence so seized is suppressed and they are deprived of any gain
from their unlawful conduct. The Chief Justice excoriates this
reasoning as "a wistful dream . . .both conceptually sterile and
practically ineffective .. ."28 There is no "empirical evidence"
that the rule is in fact a deterrent; instead it has set the guilty
criminal free and has not reduced errors in judgment by the police. 29
Admittedly motivated by his resentment of the decision in Coolidge
v. New Hampshire,3" the Chief Justice castigated the "inflexible"
and "monolithic" rigidity of "an anomalous and ineffective mecha-
nism" which requires suppression of evidence, whether gained
through inadvertent errors in police judgment or deliberate viola-
tion of constitutional rights.3'
Even in this scathing censure of present doctrine Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Burger did not advocate that Weeks v. United States and Mapp
v. Ohio3 2 be immediately overruled; the police should not be given
the impression that all restraints have been removed and that "an
open season on 'criminals' had been declared. 3 3 Instead he en-
26. Id. at 418.
27. Id. at 414. The "fair play" argument would be met by the availability of an effective
alternative remedy. That exclusion is required by the privilege against self-incrimination-a
favorite theory of Mr. Justice Black, note 38 infra-was rebutted by the reasoning that the
fifth amendment privilege does not protect against production of evidence but against com-
pulsion to perform the production.
28. Id. at 415.
29. Id. at 416-18.
30. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
31. 403 U.S. 388, 418-20 (1971).
32. See notes 13 and 14 supra.
33. 403 U.S. 388, 421 (1971).
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dorsed a statutory remedy, analogous to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, as a complete substitute for the exclusion of evidence procured
in violation of the fourth amendment.3 4 The Chief Justice assumed
that the states would initiate remedial systems patterned after his
proposed federal model, and he strongly hinted that they proceed
without awaiting congressional action. 5
Coolidge v. New Hampshire36 exemplified the fragmentation of
the Burger Court upon particular rules which were legacies from the
Warren Court. The plurality opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart 37 held
that the search warrant was invalid because it had not been issued
by a neutral magistrate and that the search and seizure could not
be justified as a search incident to arrest, an automobile search, or
a "plain view" seizure. Regarding the exclusionary rule, the princi-
pal significance of Coolidge is the dissent of Mr. Justice Black, who
tenaciously repeated his contention that the exclusionary rule is
commanded by the fifth amendment and not the fourth.3 8 To him
the Court had erred grievously in reading into the fourth amend-
ment "the exclusionary rule as a judge-made rule of evidence de-
signed and utilized to enforce the majority's own notions of proper
police conduct." 9
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun joined in much of
Mr. Justice Black's dissent, but each stipulated that, while he
agreed that the exclusionary rule was not required by the fourth
amendment, he could not accept the contention that it was required
by the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 0 The
Chief Justice, consistent with his dissent in Bivens,4' lamented
Coolidge as an illustration of "the monstrous price we pay for the
exclusionary rule in which we seem to have imprisoned ourselves."
Following Coolidge, controversy respecting the exclusionary rule
34. Id. at 421-23.
35. Id. at 423-24.
36. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
37. Mr. Justice Stewart was joined in full only by Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.
38. 403 U.S. 443, 496-98 (1971). This proposition, which the Chief Justice had made a
particular effort to rebut in Bivens, note 27 supra, is derived from Mr. Justice Black's con-
struction of a concurring opinion in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886), twenty-
eight years before Weeks.
39. Id. at 499.
40. Id. at 492-93, 510.
41. Id. at 493. See notes 25-35 supra and accompanying text.
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became quiescent.2 In United States v. Robinson and Gustafson v.
Florida,43 six of the nine Justices agreed that an arrest upon proba-
ble cause authorized a complete search of the suspect's person by
the arresting officer. The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Rehnquist
contains no challenge to the exclusionary rule per se. On the con-
trary, he proceeds from the premise that the unqualified right to
search the person of the arrestee was well settled when the exclu-
sionary rule was adopted in Weeks v. United States" and that right
has been preserved in fourth amendment decisions since that date.15
Only a month after Robinson, however, serious misgivings over
the perpetuation of the exclusionary rule returned to the forefront.
In United States v. Calandra6 the Court held that a grand jury
witness could be compelled to answer questions based on evidence
obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. Though the majority,
through Mr. Justice Powell, disavowed any intent "to consider this
extent of the [exclusionary] rule's efficacy in criminal trials," it
noted the fact of disagreement as to the rule's effectiveness and the
lack of relevant empirical data. 7 The opinion emphasized that the
purpose of the rule was not redress of injury to the privacy of the
victim but deterrence of unlawful police conduct. 8 In sum, the rule
is a judically-created remedy designed to safeguard fourth amend-
ment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
person constitutional right of the party aggrieved. 9
42. See, however, the concurrence by Mr. Justice Powell in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973); see note 88 infra.
There is also a passage in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Cupp v. Murphy,
412 U.S. 291, 303 (1973), in which he refers to Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), as
the source of the proposition that the fourth amendment is closely related to the self-incrimi-
nation clause of the fifth. Close examination reveals, however, that he is not reaffirming the
thesis of Mr. Justice Black that the exclusionary rule is entirely dependent upon the privilege
against self-incrimination. Instead he protests that a warrantless search, which he fears was
founded only on suspicion, was used to extract evidence from the suspect's person which, to
Mr. Justice Douglas, could only be obtained in violation of the privilege against self incrimi-
nation.
43. 94 S.Ct. 467 (1973); 94 S.Ct. 488 (1973).
44. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
45. 94 S.Ct. at 472; 94 S.Ct. at 491.
46. 94 S.Ct. 613 (1974).
47. Id. at 620 n.5.
48. Id. at 619, citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965), the foundation case
refusing retrospectively to fourth amendment rights. See note 16 supra.
49. Id. at 620.
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Though suppression of unlawfully seized evidence at trial "is
thought to be an important method of effectuating" the guarantees
of the fourth amendment, it does not follow that every deterrent to
police misconduct is constitutionally required. The incentive to dis-
regard the fourth amendment in the procurement of evidence for the
grand jury "is substantially negated" by the inadmissibility of such
evidence at trial.50
Mr. Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined by Douglas
and Marshall, JJ., bitterly assailed the majority's pronouncement
that the exclusionary rule was merely a "judicially-created remedy"
which operated as a general deterrent against proscribed conduct.5'
The "downgrading" of the rule to dependency upon the ambit of
deterrence52 was, to the dissenters, based upon a profound miscon-
ception. Curtailment of official misconduct may be a beneficial con-
sequence, but the true motivation should be "the imperative of
judicial integrity. 5 3 Although admittedly the deterrent factor was
a cause for limitation of the exclusionary rule to prospective effect,
it cannot become the sole criterion for the rule's general applica-
tion. 4 Even though Calandra had been granted transactional im-
munity from prosecution, the compulsion that he testify necessarily
"entangle[d] the courts in the illegal acts of Government agents."5
To the dissenting Justices the real import of Calandra was that
the demise of the exclusionary rule might be close at hand.
I thus fear that when next we confront a case of a conviction rested
on illegally seized evidence, today's decision will be invoked to sus-
tain the conclusion in that case also that "it is unrealistic to assume"
that application of the rule at trial would "significantly further" the
goal of deterrence-though, if the police are presently undeterred, it
50. Id. at 621.
51. Id.. at 625.
52. Id. at 624.
53. Id. at 625-26, quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
54. 94 S.Ct. at 625. The retrospectivity decisions seem to indicate without qualification
that fourth amendment rights be accorded only prospective effect because their prime justifi-
cation is the necessity for an "effective deterrent to lawless police action." Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965). There is "no likelihood of unreliability or coercion," and
the exclusionary rule is merely a "procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt" or "the
fairness of the trial." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 250 (1969), quoting Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638-39 (1965).
55. Id. at 628, quoting Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 51 (1972).
1974]
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is difficult to see how removal of the sanction of exclusion will induce
more lawful official conduct.-
III.
In contrast to the disputes regarding the exclusionary rule, there
has been relatively little debate over its enforcement against the
states.17 Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in Mapp,58 and, though con-
curring in the result of Ker, he refused to join in the Court's opinion
that state searches were to be judged by federal standards.-, Never-
theless, writing for the majority in Whiteley v. Warden,"0 in which
a state prisoner was granted habeas corpus relief, he merely men-
tioned Mapp and Ker in a footnote6' and apparently accepted them
as precedents for the Whiteley decision. Even Mr. Chief Justice
Burger's criticism of the exclusionary rule in his dissent in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents62 refused to recommend that either
Mapp v. Ohio or Weeks v. United States be overruled until the
legislature created a sufficient alternative remedy.63
The threshold issue in Coolidge v. New Hampshire4 was the
validity of a state statute which sanctioned the issuance of a search
warrant by a law enforcement officer. That this type of statute was
one of the "workable rules" preserved for development by the states
in Ker v. California,5 was expressly rejected by a majority of the
Court 6 in a reversion to the criterion of Wolf v. Colorado:7 "[T]he
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-
56. 94 S.Ct. at 628. The majority had noted that, even without the exclusionary rule, the
grand jury witness might redress the injury to his privacy by the institution of an action for
damages. Id. at 623 n.10, citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411
(1971). This occasioned the dissent's most caustic rebuke, "In other words, officialdom may
profit from its lawlessness if it is willing to pay a price." Id. at 628.
57. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
58. 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961).
59. 374 U.S. 23, 44 (1963).
60. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
61. Id. at 564 n.6.
62. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
63. Id. at 421.
64. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
65. 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).
66. The plurality opinion of Stewart, J., commanded the complete assent of Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., 403 U.S. 443, 445 (1971). Harlan, J., explicitly joined in Part I
of the Stewart opinion, Id. at 491. White, J., implicitly agreed with that segment, Id. at 510.
67. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society.""
Insofar as it had refused to extend the Weeks rule to state courts,
Wolf was overruled by Mapp.69 That it has not, however, been rele-
gated to antiquarian interest is demonstrated, not only by the opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Coolidge, but by the concurring opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Harlan. He began with the blunt statement that
the law of search and seizure "is due for an overhauling," which
should begin with the overruling of Mapp and Ker.0 Because the
states were compelled to conform to the federal requirements, there
was no new opportunity to observe contrasting procedures nor to
obtain current data to prove or disprove the "deterrent value" of the
exclusionary rule. To allow any tolerance for the diversity of the
states' problems "the basic constitutional mistakes of Mapp and
Ker" necessitated a relaxation of the federal standards of search and
seizure." But for the command that Coolidge be decided by federal
standards, Mr. Justice Harlan would have voted to sustain the con-
viction because the action by the state did not offend the values "at
the core of the Fourth Amendment." 2
Since the Harlan concurrence in Coolidge no member of the Court
has expressly sought a reconsideration of Mapp or Ker.13 One can
only speculate that the renewed opposition to the Weeks exclusion-
ary rule itself has diverted attention from the decisions which en-
large Weeks as a barrier against state actions.
IV.
The general rule stemming from Linkletter v. Walker 4 is that
fourth amendment rights shall not be accorded retrospective appli-
68. 403 U.S. 443, 453, quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
69. 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
70. 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971).
71. Id. at 490-91.
72. Id. at 491, quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
73. Mapp and Ker were skirted in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), where the
majority, through Mr. Justice Rehnquist, observed that the application to the states of the
federal standards for automobile searches was complicated by extensive state contacts with
motor vehicle licensing and highway safety. A search by local officers in the exercise of these
"community caretaking functions" was sustained despite the lack of mobility of the vehicle
which is the conventional justification for the federal automobile search. Id. at 440-41.
74. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). See note 16 supra.
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cation. The majority of the Court has adhered to this concept with
a unity which is remarkable in search and seizure cases. 75 The ret-
rospectivity decisions are more significant for present purposes to
illuminate the contrasting perspectives of the Justices toward other
fourth amendment principles.
The Court in Williams v. United States" voted for prospective
application of Chimel v. California.77 Mr. Justice White, writing for
a plurality of the Court, stated that the new doctrine raised no
question of the defendant's guilt but excluded otherwise relevant
evidence "to deter official invasions of individual privacy protected
by the Fourth Amendment. ' 78 The deterrent purpose would be
"only marginally furthered" by granting retroactivity to this exten-
sion of the exclusionary rule.79
Concurring in Williams, Mr. Justice Brennan agreed that evi-
dence seized in violation of the fourth amendment is suppressed to
deter other unconstitutional searches and to preserve the right of
privacy.80 Because exclusion does not improve "the factfinding pro-
cess at trial" the new constitutional standards should not be retro-
actively applied.8 ' His separation from the plurality arose on the
issue of the defendant's probable guilt, with Mr. Justice Brennan
vigorously denying that the Court had the right to consider guilt or
innocence as a determinant of retrospectivity.5 2
75. Of the present Court, Burger, C.J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, and Blackmun, JJ.,
have consistently voted for prospectivity under the fourth amendment. Hill v. California, 401
U.S. 797 (1971); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Williams v. United States, 401
U.S. 646 (1971). Mr. Justice Marshall has joined the majority as to cases on collateral review,
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. at 665-66. Only Mr. Justice Douglas has uniformly voted
for retroactive application. No fourth amendment retroactivity cases have been decided since
the accession of Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.
76. 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
77. 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which, in brief, reduced the permissible area of search incident to
arrest.
78. 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971).
79. Id. at 654-55.
80. This can be contrasted to Mr. Justice Brennan's Calandra dissent, 94 S.Ct. 613, 625
(1974).
81. 401 U.S. 646, 663 (1971).
82. Id. at 665. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971), was controlled by Williams v. United
States for the prospective application of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); and United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), was controlled by Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244
(1969), for the prospective application of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 244 (1967).
Mr. Justice Black, who pursued a highly individualistic course through all the search and
seizure cases, concurred specially to preserve his adherence to absolute retrospectivity and
[Vol. 8:433
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V.
Kaufman v. United States,3 one of the last search and seizure
decisions by the Warren Court, established that fourth amendment
claims were cognizable in federal habeas corpus review of federal or
state convictions.84 Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, repeated the re-
curring theme that the "one primary and overrriding purpose" of
the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of police misconduct, 5 and
he argued that guilt or innocence must be an essential determinant
in the availability of collateral relief.86 Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr.
Justice Stewart, also dissenting, expressly disassociated them-
selves from Mr. Justice Black's thesis that availability of habeas
corpus relief should depend upon the substantiality of the prisoner's
allegation of innocence. 7
to reiterate his disapproval of the principles of Chimel and Katz. Hill v. California, 401 U.S.
797, 806 (1971); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 754 (1971); Williams v. United States,
401 U.S. 646, 660 (1971). See also Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 574 n.4 (1971).
The equally independent philosophy of Mr. Justice Harlan is illustrated by his dissent in
Williams v. United States, reported sub nom. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675
(1971). The new rule should be applied to all cases upon direct review. Id. at 681. Improve-
ment of the factfinding process at trial should be discarded as the standard for retrospective
relief upon collateral review. Id. at 694. Habeas corpus relief would be granted for failure to
observe those procedures which are "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "Id. at 693.
The adoption of this language from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), would
seemingly indicate that search and seizure on habeas corpus should revert to Wolf v. Colo-
rado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
83. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
84. That a defendant convicted in a state court had standing to seek federal habeas relief
on this ground had been tacitly accepted for several years before Kaufman, but only one state
prisoner had been successful in the Supreme Court on the merits of his claim, Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). It is much simpler to equate, for present purposes, the federal
and state prisoner on federal habeas corpus.
85. 394 U.S. 217, 238 (1969).
86. Id. at 235.
87. Id. at 242. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 574-75
(1971), reiterated that the petitioner should be denied habeas corpus relief unless "he can
currently show that he was innocent." The Chief Justice fully concurred with Mr. Justice
Black, and Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred to an unspecified extent.
Mr. Justice Stewart confirmed the sentiment of his separate dissent in Kaufman, that
fourth amendment violations simply did not warrant federal collateral relief, by his special
concurrences in Chambers v. Maroney, 339 U.S. 42, 54 (1970), and Williams v. United States,
401 U.S. 646, 660 (1971).
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Williams v. United States, sub nom. Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971), considered that adherence to Kaufman compelled the con-
clusion that it was not the purpose of the habeas writ to determine whether the petitioner
was in fact guilty or innocent. Id. at 694. He ended with an expression of regret that Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) had not been decided upon the theory that federal habeas
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,5 the Supreme Court held that
knowledge of the right to refuse is not an essential element of volun-
tary consent to search. 9 However, this decision afforded Mr. Justice
Powell, concurring, the opportunity to criticize, first, the decision
in Kaufman v. United States and, second, the exclusionary rule
itself.9 The broadened scope of habeas corpus may be justified when
the petitioner presents a constitutional argument relevant to his
innocence,9' but the prisoner who advances a fourth amendment
claim is ordinarily "quite justly detained," and there is rarely doubt
as to his guilt. This argument is an intentional reaffirmation of Mr.
Justice Black's dissent in Kaufman."
The "oft-asserted reason" for the exclusionary rule is deterrence
of police misconduct, and, like the Chief Justice in his Bivens dis-
sent,93 Mr. Justice Powell does not advocate the rule's "total aban-
donment (certainly not in the absence of some other deterrent to
deviant police conduct)."94 Nevertheless, any merit which the rule
may have at trial and on direct appeal is "anemic" in a collateral
attack.9" As recognized by the Court in Linkletter v. Walker,96 the
police misconduct has occurred and cannot be corrected by release
of the prisoner, nor can "the ruptured privacy" of the victim be
corpus was unavailable for challenges to search and seizure. 401 U.S. at 702 n.9.
88. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
89. It was, however, necessary that Mr. Justice Stewart, for the majority, distinguish the
"trial rights," which may legitimately be waived only with full knowledge of their conse-
quences, from the fourth amendment rights, which "are of a wholly different order ...
[whichl have nothing whatever to do with promoting a fair ascertainment of truth at a
criminal trial," 412 U.S. 218, 242, but which serve rather as protection against "arbitrary
intrusion by the police." Id. at 242, quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). There
was "no likelihood of unreliability" in the result of unreasonable search and seizure, and, as
was demonstrated in the retrospectivity cases, the protections of the fourth amendment are
unrelated to the "integrity of the fact-finding process" at trial. Id at 242, quoting Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638, 639 (1965). See text at notes 76-82, supra.
90. 412 U.S. 218, 250. Mr. Justice Powell would limit collateral review of fourth amend-
ment claims to the question of whether the prisoner had a fair opportunity for their considera-
tion in state court. However, the circumstances of the "fair opportunity" for state adjudica-
tion are not developed.
91. Id. at 265.
92. Id. at 258.
93. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421 (1971).
94. 412 U.S. 218, 267 n. 25 (1973).
95. Id. at 269.
96. 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
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restored.97 The question on habeas is too rarely the petitioner's
innocence
and too frequently whether some evidence of undoubted probative
value has been admitted in violation of an exclusionary rule ritualisti-
call; applied without due regard to whether it has the slightest likeli-
hood of achieving its avowed prophylactic purpose."
CONCLUSION
The stormy course of the fourth amendment in the Burger Court
cannot be merely attributed to ad hoc responses to particular chal-
lenges. It is instead the product of fundamental antipathy over basic
principles. While this remains undiminished, the discord over the
fourth amendment will continue.
97. 412 U.S. 218, 270 (1973).
98. Id. at 275. Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., joined in the Powell opinion in Schneckloth.
Id. at 250. Blackmun, J., expressed substantial agreement but felt that it was not yet neces-
sary to reconsider Kaufman. Id. at 249.
A similar voting pattern emerged in Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 300 (1973). Although
Mr. Justice Stewart had twice reaffirmed his Kaufman dissent, see note 87 supra, he did not
join in the Powell concurrences in Schneckloth and in Cupp, but he was indeed the author
of the Court's opinions in these cases. It is plausible that he disapproved of the revival of Mr.
Justice Black's argument that the availability of habeas corpus should depend upon a sub-
stantial allegation of innocence. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 219, 242 (1969). In any
event, Mr. Justice Stewart in his Schneckloth opinion expressly refrained from consideration
of the issue raised by Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion. 412 U.S. 218, 249 n.38 (1973).
The dissents by Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., also avoided that question.
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